During his tenure at the Pentagon, the United States also initiated plans to relocate the US garrison in Seoul (and other facilities) further south.

The redeployment of the 2nd Brigade Combat Team back to the United States (after a deployment to Iraq) was an integral part of RumsfeldвЂ™s larger vision for reforming the alliance. The last time the United States reduced its force posture in South Korea was in 2004 when then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld redeployed a 3,600-person combat brigade from the Second Infantry Division. Public support in South Korea for the US military alliance typically falls along party lines, with more conservative parties (like the Saenuri) preferring closer ties and the more liberal-leaning parties (like Democratic Party of Korea, or Minjoo) often calling for reforms. The presence of US forces on the peninsula has been a controversial issue in South Korean domestic politics, since at least the time of the Kwangju incident in 1980. However, given TrumpвЂ™s repeated questioning of alliance relationships and his inflammatory rhetoric about burden-sharing, some commentators have begun to speculate that the president may be inclined to agree to a US troop reduction on cost-cutting grounds.

However, in the long term, PyongyangвЂ™s goal continues to be the departure of all US combat forces from South Korea.Д®very US administration since Eisenhower has treated PyongyangвЂ™s demands that Washington pull its troops out of South Korea as a non-starter, arguing instead that substantial behavioral changes by North Korea precede any changes to the US force posture on the peninsula. When North Korean regime officials say they want to transform ties with South Korea into вЂњ a relationship of reconciliation and cooperation,вЂќ as Kim reportedly did in March, they mean a relationship in which the United States no longer has a military presence on the Korean Peninsula.ДЄlthough we wonвЂ™t know all of North KoreaвЂ™s conditions until the May summit, press reports from a working-level meeting between Pyongyang and Washington earlier this month indicate the North Koreans want the United States to remove its вЂњnuclear and strategic assetsвЂќ from the peninsula as part of any deal, but may be more flexible when it comes to the presence of American troops there. This is because the North Koreans have consistently called for the departure of US forces from the Korean Peninsula since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953. Ironically, the negotiating position we know the most about going into the spring summits is that of the least transparent actor-Pyongyang. As I explain below, however, there are powerful bureaucratic constraints that suggest the main security pillars on the peninsula are unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. If the past is any indicator, North Korea will demand substantial changes to the existing US-South Korean security relationship in exchange for any concessions to its nuclear program. While other commentators have focused on the technological aspects ( testing freeze, capping limits, etc.) of a possible nuclear deal, few have asked what a вЂњpackage dealвЂќ might mean for the US-South Korean military alliance and the security architecture on the peninsula in the near to medium term. YesterdayвЂ™s news that CIA Director Mike Pompeo visited North Korea earlier this month, along with next weekвЂ™s scheduled meeting between North KoreaвЂ™s Kim Jong Un and South Korean President Moon Jae-in, suggests officials on all sides are moving ahead with plans for a historic summit between Kim and US President Donald Trump this summer.

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